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SOME COMMENTS ON THE REAPPORTIONMENT
CASES
Paul G. Kauper*
appraisal of the Supreme Court's decisions in the legislative
reapportionment cases must necessarily distinguish between
the basic policy ingredients and social consequences of the decisions
on the one hand, and the question whether the results were reached
by a proper exercise of judicial power on the other. Respecting the
first of these considerations, I have no difficulty identifying the
social advantages accruing from these decisions. Because of the stress
on the population principle, the decisions will afford a greater voice
to urban interests, will make the legislative process more responsive
to current needs of particular concern to urban dwellers, will force
the states to adhere more faithfully to standards that, in part at
least, they have already set for themselves, and, in vitalizing the
processes of state government, hopefully will contribute to the
strength and integrity of our federal system. These plus considerations must be weighed against the risk that the kind of apportionment now required by judicial mandate will subject various kinds
of minority interests to the overriding concerns of well-organized
majorities and against the further consideration that the adoption
of a single rule of apportionment, frozen into the Constitution by
judicial interpretation, may preclude consideration of other and
varied schemes that are responsive to the extensive, expert thinking
that has gone into the subject. At this point, however, it may be
conceded that the immediately discernible social advantages accruing
from the decisions outweigh the more speculative disadvantages.
But whether these results were appropriately achieved through
the exercise of judicial power is another matter, and it is to this
question that my comments are addressed. The Court's decisions
deal with a problem that is essentially political: namely, what are
the proper standards for legislative representation. Admittedly, the
decisions are revolutionary in character, and here I speak particularly of the recent state legislative reapportionment cases. These
decisions, lacking support in judicial precedent, force the states to
depart from legislative apportionment patterns that have had the
sanction of history and from schemes that have been approved by
the electors of the states through their own constitutional processes.
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Moreover, the implementation of the Court's decisions has had the
effect of giving federal and state courts a field day in using their
equity powers with an almost cavalier disregard of the legislative
power and of the orderly processes of government. We are being
treated to an unprecedented assertion of judicial supremacy. These
consequences give ground for pause before standing up to give three
cheers for the decisions.

I.

EVOLUTION OF THE ONE MAN-ONE VOTE RULE

Baker v. Carr1 opened this new chapter of judicial adventurism.
That decision was understandable: I have no basic quarrel with
the proposition that a state apportionment scheme is subject to
judicial examination under the Constitution. The situation in
Tennessee presented a particularly appealing case, since the state
legislature had failed to act in accordance with the mandate of the
state constitution and the state constitutional system provided no
effective opportunity for redress through the processes of popular
referendum or initiative.
The real difficulty presented by Baker, it appears to me, was the
Court's reliance upon the equal protection clause as the basis for
judicial examination. It is difficult to avoid Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
conclusion, stated in his dissent, that the Court, in the name of
equal protection, was in effect opening up the question of what
constitutes a republican form of government for judicial examination.2 This is the central issue in these cases-what form of apportionment is compatible with a representative form of governmentand the guarantee of a republican form of government is the explicit
constitutional provision relevant to the problem. But, the emphasis
on equal protection and its subsequent development in terms of a
discriminatory impairment of the right to vote paved the way for
a judicial treatment that centered upon what I regard as a specious
conception of personal right rather than upon the institutional
aspect of the problem. This was not a necessary consequence, however, since the equal protection standard was broad and flexible
enough to permit an inquiry directed to the question whether a
state apportionment scheme was unreasonable or arbitrary when
measured by a general standard of what is essential to the processes
and institutions of representative government.
The later decision of Gray v. Sanders, 8 holding invalid the county
I. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Id. at 297.
3. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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unit system employed in Georgia to count votes cast for state officers
in a state-wide election, understandably rested upon an equal protection ground. Once a state has determined the boundaries of a
voting district (for the purpose of this election the state was the
district) it is difficult to defend the rationality of a subclassification
that deliberately weights the votes cast on a county basis, thereby
giving to some electors a disproportionate voting power in the
choice of state officers. Mr. Justice Douglas stated that "the conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one
vote."• Gray dealt with a very special question that did not go to the
heart of the legislative apportionment problem. Thus, the holding
in Gray could be kept within narrow limits. But the broad statement by Mr. Justice Douglas was expansible and capable of being
forged into a principle premised upon personal right, which, if
carried far enough, would furnish an almost automatic answer to the
legislative apportionment problem.
Next in progression was Wesberry v. Sanders/; wherein the Court
committed itself to the one man-one vote principle (whatever this
may mean in this context), so far as apportionment of the House
of Representatives of the Congress of the United States is concerned.
This decision was based upon interpretation of article I of the
Constitution, which provides that Representatives shall be elected
by the people of the several states. Starting with this constitutional
requirement, the Court leaps to the dubious conclusion that districts
set up under state law must, as far as practicable, be equal in population. Mr. Justice Black found support for this conclusion in the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and in the views of
prominent figures in the early history of the country. Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his dissent, does an effective job in demolishing Mr.
Justice Black's historical argument by establishing that those historical facts prove nothing more than that it was intended that
representation of a state in the lower house of Congress should be
determined on a population basis as distinguished from the Senate
where each state was to have two representatives regardless of population. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Harlan points out, article I of the
Constitution commits to Congress the ultimate authority to legislate
with respect to congressional districting. Congress did expressly
4. Id. at !181.
5. 376 U.S. l (1964).
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exercise this power for some years and did require voting districts
to be approximately equal. But, it later repealed this legislation
and thereby left the fixing of congressional districts to the discretion
of state legislatures. There is much strength in Mr. Justice Harlan's
argument that Congress, with ultimate authority in this matter, has
made a decision within the sphere of its constitutional competence,
that this determines the status of the question as a "political question," and that there is, therefore, no room at this point for judicial
intervention. It should be kept in mind, in this connection, that the
Court in its earlier opinion in Baker had said that it was the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
federal government that had given rise to the political question
concept, thereby strongly intimating that the Court would not
impose its will in an area committed by the Constitution to congressional discretion. Yet this aspect of Baker is promptly disregarded in Wesberry, which dealt with a question committed to a
coordinate branch of the federal government. Wesberry can possibly
be interpreted to mean that the standard stated by the Court is the
one to be followed by the states in the absence of standards stated
by Congress. Since the Constitution requires representation of the
states in the House of Representatives to be based upon population,
it is not unreasonable for the Court to say that equality of districts
in terms of voting population should be the general rule unless
different or more flexible standards are prescribed by Congress. This,
however, is a strained interpretation of the Wesberry opinion,
which, on its face, quite clearly demonstrates that the Court has
now fixed a single constitutional standard for congressional districting and that there is no room for congressional legislation that
would permit deviation from this standard. Given this latter, more
realistic construction, Wesberry does represent a substantial judicial
intrusion upon congressional power and a judicial decision on a
"political question" as the Court defined that concept in Baker v.
Carr.
A feature of the Wesberry case that deserves special attention is
the emphasis in the latter part of Mr. Justice Black's opinion on the
right to vote.6 He there points out that the right to vote for federal
offices is a constitutionally created right under article I, and he
makes it clear that, in his opinion, this right to vote is unconstitutionally abridged or restricted unless congressional seats in a state
are equally apportioned on a population basis. From the right to
6. Id. at 17-18.
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vote, he deduced the one man-one vote principle, which in tum is
the key to equality in representation. There is a gap in this reasoning. No one was contending in this case that qualified voters were
denied a right to vote for congressmen, and it was equally clear that
every qualified voter had one vote. The right that the Court relied
upon was not the right to vote, but rather a personal right to a
numerically determined proportionate share of political influence.
But the Constitution does not speak of such a right. Of course, there
is a constitutionally created right to vote for federal officers, and
Congress may act to protect this right by punishing fraud, corruption, and intimidation at the polls; the cases cited by Mr. Justice
Black prove no more than this. It is another thing to say that this
right to vote furnishes the key to legislative apportionment problems.
It is also easy to see that, if the right to vote, expanded into a
right to equal representation based on numbers, furnishes the basic
premise in these cases, the Court has equipped itself with a simple
answer to the apportionment problem. By assuming this questionbegging premise, the Court's conclusion is clearly indicated. This
became evident when the Court handed down its decisions in the
batch of state legislative reapportionment cases at the end of the
recent term. 7 According to these cases, only one general standard
-the population standard-is constitutionally permitted in apportioning both houses of a state legislature. This in tum means that
population must be apportioned to the several voting districts on
an equal basis, so far as practicable, and that any deviation therefrom will be permitted only when a rational necessity for the
deviation is shown. With one blow the Court struck at the heart of
the well-established, traditional bicameral system of state government. Even more surprising was the Court's decision in the Colorado case, setting aside a legislative apportionment scheme that had
been submitted to and approved by the electors in a free and open
election. The Court felt it necessary to assume a guardian's role in
order to protect the voters against themselves and in order to establish the Court's own predilection as to the kind of political system
that our Constitution should sanction, even though this frustrated
the expression of the popular will.
7. Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964) (Alabama).
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PROBLEMS OF .ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION

As stressed earlier, the basic issue in these cases is what kind of
representation processes and institutions are required to assure a
government that rests upon the will of the people. This issue opens
up a large and complex area involving many theories and modes
of representation. Although the Constitution does not provide express answers for the states, the Court devised a single and simple
solution: all representation must be based upon population alone,
and population must be equally apportioned to the several districts.
My basic criticism is that the Court, by judicial fiat, is projecting
a simple, but absolute, solution to a complex problem. I find,
nothing in history or political theories of representation to support
the idea that representation on the basis of population equally
apportioned is the only system consistent with either republican or
democratic ideas of government. If effectuation of majority rule is
the premise underlying this exclusive theory of representation, then
why not carry through to the logical conclusion and require statewide election of all legislators? Or, if effective counting of each
man's vote is the objective, then why not say that the Constitution
requires a system of proportionate voting and representation? To
raise these questions is to suggest the complexity of the problem
and the range of possible solutions. The basic scheme of representation goes to the heart of a state's political processes: how political
strength and influence shall be distributed and diffused. This is a
matter that should be left to the people of the state to determine
through their own constitutional processes, subject to a judicial check
to determine whether the system chosen employs standards that are
constitutionally objectionable, such as race or religion, or is otherwise
so arbitrary or capricious that it cannot fit into any rational scheme
of representation. Population, geography, the political organization
of the state, the nature and variety of economic interests, and the
diffusion or concentration of voting strength are all factors that are
relevant in determining whether a state by its apportionment
scheme has worked out a fair and balanced scheme of representation
responsive to the state's own characteristics. The fact that the people
of a state in an open election have by majority vote adopted a
scheme that they deem responsive to the state's needs and characteristics is also a consideration that should carry substantial weight in
any judicial determination of the issue. And surely history should
not be lightly disregarded. One may cheerfully concede that the
pattern established for the Congress of the United States does not
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in itself prove the validity of any particular apportionment scheme
adopted by the states; yet, the long established state bicameral
legislative scheme, which gives effect to varying theories of representation as between the two houses, affords persuasive evidence of
what we heretofore have understood the republican form of government to include.
The Court uses the equal protection clause as the formal vehicle
for condemning apportionment schemes that do not satisfy the
population standard. Its conclusion is that a system that does not
afford equal representation to voters results in discriminatory
denial of the right to vote. The right to vote emerges, then, as a
critical element. This raises interesting questions. For example,
what is the constitutional source of the right to vote? Article I
assures the right to vote for federal officers. The right to vote for
state officers must have its source elsewhere. The Court refers to it as
a fundamental right. 8 As a fundamental right, it must have its
source either in the substantive rights interpretation of the due
process clause or in the guarantee of a republican form of government.
Actually, in applying the equal protection clause, it is not necessary to show that there is a discriminatory denial of a fundamental
right. It is enough to show that a person is denied the equal enjoyment of a right, privilege, or immunity by reference to an irrational
classification. But, the Court chose to rely upon its characterization
of the right to vote as fundamental in constructing its theory under
the equal protection clause: The more fundamental the right, the
more important it is that the Court inject its theory as to the kinds
of classifications that may be used to restrict this right; an apportionment system that does not rest upon equal apportionment of
population dilutes and debases the fundamental right to vote and,
hence, results in discriminatory treatment. It dilutes and debases
the right because it does not afford equal representation.
Here again, the right to vote gets tangled up with the Court's
theory of proper representation. There can be no quarrel with the
proposition that the Court should look carefully at classifications
that determine a person's right to vote; however, what is really involved in these cases is not a discriminatory denial of the right to
vote, but rather a violation of the judicially created right to a
system that recognizes numbers as the only basis for representation.
That the right to vote drops out of the picture at this point is
8. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 7, at 561-62.
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evidenced by the fact that the Court, in speaking of population as
the proper standard, does not speak of voting population but instead
speaks of the total population of a ~ven district.
By reading all that it does into the right to vote, the Court automatically reaches its conclusion under the equal protection argument. For, if the right to vote carries with it a personal right to a
proportionate share of political influence determined only upon
the basis of numbers by the ratio of one man's vote to the total
population in the state, then, of course, any system of apportionment
not based upon equal apportionment of population must necessarily
fail. The right that the Court creates leaves no room for a judicial inquiry into whether a legislative apportionment scheme can be fitted
into a rational scheme of representation by reference to the characteristics and problems of a particular state. The Court, by the
premise it postulates on the nature of the right, assumes the conclusion respecting the equal protection argument. Indeed, by
positing this right the equal protection argument becomes merely a
facade that embellishes the conclusion. Thus, the decisions tum
less upon equal protection than upon a new conception of fundamental right or upon the Court's implied understanding of what
constitutes a republican form of government.
Ample precedent supports the idea that legislative classification
meets equal protection demands if it rests upo.µ a rational basis by
reference to the purpose of the legislation. According to the established theory of equal protection, a voter's right to equal treatment
is satisfied if he is treated equally with other voters within a class
established pursuant to a rational theory of legislative representation. As Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out, a wide variety of considerations may be taken into account by the legislature or by the
people themselves in determining the basis of representation. 9 In
deciding that the Constitution permits only representation based
upon population equally apportioned, the Court makes a policy
decision and expresses its preference for one exclusive theory of
apportionment.
9. "What constitutes a rational plan reasonably designed to achieve this objective
will vary from State to State, since each State is unique, in terms of topography,
geography, demography, history, heterogeneity and concentration of population, variety
of social and economic interests, and in the operation and interrelation of its political
institutions. But so long as a State's apportionment plan reasonably achieves, in the
light of the State's own characteristics, effective and balanced representation of all sub•
stantial interests, without sacrificing the principle of effective majority rule, that plan
cannot be considered irrational." Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713,
751 (1964).
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It may be argued that, once the Court had embarked upon the
process of examining apportionment schemes, it had a bear by the
tail and had no choice in the end except to adopt a population
standard, since any inquiry into the rationality of an apportionment
scheme would have required the Court to articulate and weigh the
factors determining rationality, whereas the population factor
furnishes a clear-cut and simple standard. The simple solution to
complex problems by the invocation of absolutes has its appeal,
whether in politics or in law. As Dean Griswold has pointed out,
reliance upon absolutes avoids the necessity of the kind of judgment
that appraises all of the relevant considerations.10 Yet, it is this
kind of judgment that goes to the heart of the judicial process.
Surely the Court has the resourcefulness to conduct a meaningful
review of state apportionment schemes, based upon the wide thinking and literature on the subject, without having to make a radical
break with the system and theories that find ample support in
American experience and practice.
Justices Stewart and Clark demonstrated in their opinions that
the Court could have made an inquiry into legislative apportionment schemes without setting up any single, judicially formulated
standard and that such an inquiry would have been meaningful
and would not have meant a judicial rubber-stamping of just
any apportionment scheme or practice.11 According to Mr. Justice
Stewart, the equal protection clause demands but two basic attributes of any plan for state legislative apportionment. "First, it
demands that in the light of the state's own characteristics and
needs, the plan must be a rational one. Secondly, it demands that
the plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration
of the will of a majority of the electorate of the state. I think it is
apparent that any plan of legislative apportionment which could
10. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark, 8 UTAH. L. R.Ev. 167, 171-75 (1963).
11. Both concurred in the holdings in the cases dealing with the legislative apportionment plans in Alabama, Virginia, and Delaware. Mr. Justice Clark concurred in the
result in the Maryland case, whereas Mr. Justice Stewart voted to vacate the judgment
and to remand the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals for consideration of the
question whether the Maryland apportionment "could be shown systematically to
prevent ultimate effective majority rule." Both dissented in the New York and Colorado
cases. Their basic views are set forth in their dissenting opinions in Lucas v. 44th
Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, at 741 and 744 (1964). Mr. Justice Clark, while
writing a short opinion of his own, also joined Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan, it should be noted, dissented from the decisions in all the
recent state legislative apportionment cases. His dissenting opinion, applicable to all
the cases, is found in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, at 589 (1964). His dissent, in accordance with his views expressed in dissent in Baker, Gray, and Wesberry, is based on
the central proposition that questions of legislative apportionment are political questions not appropriate for judicial determination.
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be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid
under accepted Equal Protection Clause standards." 12
Mr. Justice Stewart's pragmatic approach makes much sense. It
suggests a meaningful judicial inquiry that is empirical because it
examines actual data to see what are the problems of representation
faced by a state; it recognizes the variety of interests that may be
appropriately considered by a state in its apportionment scheme;
it preserves the primacy of the states in making choices in an area
where the Constitution does not dictate a single formula; and it
sets an outer limit on choice by referep.ce to a concept of "ultimate
effective majority rule." I find it regrettable that the majority saw
fit instead to impose a single standard that incorporates "their own
notions of wise political theory." 13 It strains credulity to suggest
that this result is required by the Constitution.
·Any comments upon the Court's decisions must take account
also of the extraordinary authority assumed by some lower federal
courts and some state courts in dealing with apportionment issues.
Never before has the country witnessed such a spectacle of judicial
power run riot. Courts have issued ultimata to legislatures and, in
a few instances, have themselves undertaken to prescribe proper
apportionment plans. This bold intrusion of the judiciary into the
apportionment struggle invites the risk that the courts, wittingly or
unwittingly, may become involved in the process of political gerrymandering. Moreover, in this election year, courts, in a scramble to
implement the Supreme Court's decisions, have displayed a reckless
impatience and imprudence in forcing adoption of new schemes
without opportunity for careful consideration and at the expense
of orderly election processes. For this chaotic state of affairs the
Supreme Court must assume some responsibility. Its failure to
establish standards in Baker created a situation that led lower
courts to shift for themselves. What is more important, the Court
could have firmly and effectively directed the lower courts to proceed
in an orderly and deliberate way in implementing the new constitutional principle.
12. Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., supra note II, at 753-54. According
to Mr. Justice Clark, "if one house is fairly apportioned by population ••• then the
people should have some latitude in providing, on a rational basis, for representation
in the other house." Id. at p. 742.
13. Id. at 748. Mr. Justice Stewart dissenting in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly
of State of Colorado.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The reapportionment cases again reveal the dilemma of judicial
review in a democratic society. As long as a court is vested with the
power to review legislation, the temptation is present to use judicial
power as a means of creating constitutional policy in accordance
with the Court's conception of the ideals served by the Constitution
or in accordance with what the Court regards to be wise policy as
determined by its own predilections and preferences. To adapt constitutionally stated policy to new conditions is one thing; to create
new constitutional policy in the guise of judicial interpretation is
another.
It may well be that the new constitutional principle forged by
the Court is a good one. As stated at the outset, the total consequences are likely to be salutary. Perhaps we should say that representation based upon equal apportionment of population affords
the only permissible basis of representation in a system that rests
upon the will of the people. It may be that the idea of a bicameral
legislature is obsolete. But, I am not prepared to accept the idea
that these conclusions should be forced upon the people by the
judiciary, absent a clear-cut mandate to this effect in the Constitution. The notion that the Court, by creating new constitutional
principles, should push the nation forward to the achievement of
what the Court regards as the national ideal is not without its
advocates. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion
in Reynolds v. Sims, the view exists in some quarters that "every
major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 'principle,' and that this Court should 'take the lead' in
promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act." 14
It may be that we shall make greater advances in our national life
if basic policy questions are decided for us by what Professor Burgess described as the "aristocracy of the robe," 15 or by what Judge
Learned Hand more bluntly characterized as a "bevy of Platonic
Guardians." 16 Any court, however, that aspires to a constitutional
policy-making role creates for itself the risks and hazards to which
political organs are subject. I would prefer that the Court take a
more modest view of its role and authority, if for no other reason
than that it is important for the Court to retain the popular respect
earned by it over the years as a judicial tribunal interpreting and
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964).
15. 1 BURGESS, POUTICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
16. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).

LAW

365 (1891).

254

Michigan Law Review

applying the principles expressed in the Constitution. Fortunately,
as our history amply demonstrates, public opinion and the reaction
of the coordinate branches of the government operate with a salutary force in restraining the Court when it ventures too far in imposing its will in areas that belong primarily in the domain of
legislative discretion or the popular will. I expect this to be the case
with respect to the new wave of judicial activism we are now experiencing.
The Court had a function to perform in rescuing the state
legislative process from systems of apportionment that could not be
:fitted into a rational scheme and that, in a number of instances, did
not conform to the standard prescribed by state law itself. Indeed,
if the Court had contented itself with the responsibility of requiring
the states to bring their legislative apportionment up to date in
order to conform with the plan of representation provided for in
their own constitutions, it would have rendered a valuable service.
But, in condemning all plans that do not conform to the Court's
conception of wise apportionment policy-a policy buttressed by
reference to a synthetic right forged from question-begging premises
-and in reaching its sweeping conclusions in disregard of history
and accepted principles of constitutional interpretation, the Court
has gone far beyond the necessities of the case.

